Abstract
Evidence-sharing and mutual recognition
In the fight against international crime, few weapons are more valuable than the ability for law enforcement agencies to share evidence with each other quickly and with minimum fuss. This is particularly important in the EU, where the relaxation of national borders has increased the risk of criminals evading justice by moving between countries. This theme of enhanced cooperation in the field of evidence-gathering also chimes with the EU's political goal of creating a single "area of freedom, justice and security".
The principle of "mutual recognition" underpins this cooperation: the theory is that, while criminal laws and procedures differ across EU countries, the mutual trust between them allows for mutual recognition of judicial and prosecutorial decisions from state to state. The European Investigation Order ("EIO") proposes that this principle should now apply to cross-border evidence-gathering. Proposed in April 2010, the EIO is still being negotiated over a year later. If adopted, it will change the face of evidence-sharing in the EU.
That mutual recognition instruments can cause unforeseen injustice for the defence is clear from the European Arrest Warrant ("EAW"), the flagship measure of enhanced prosecutorial cooperation. As cross-border practitioners and students of European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence will tell you, respect for defence rights varies greatly between Member States. This renders essentially illusory the mutual trust that supposedly underlies mutual recognition. Given the major implications, for human rights and fair trials, of the way evidence is gathered and transmitted across borders, it is crucial that the EIO does not embody the same flaws as the inflexible, over-rigid EAW with its inadequate safeguarding of fundamental rights.
The EIO, like the Commission's proposal before it, went beyond the Evidence Warrant by extending the kind of evidence obtainable to include material not yet in existence. This could include requests to interview suspects or witnesses or obtain information in real time, by intercepting and monitoring telephone 8 or email communications or by monitoring activity in bank accounts. States could also be required to obtain DNA samples or fingerprints and send the information to the issuing State within fixed deadlines.
The mutual recognition mechanism would allow Member States' judicial authorities to issue standard-form requests seeking evidence from other States, with limited grounds for refusal. This contrasts strongly with the existing MLA approach. There was no proportionality requirement and many feared the EIO would, like the EAW, overwhelm busy police forces with orders from other countries to investigate offences as minor as bike thefts.
The EIO also drew criticism due to the lack of any impact assessment or open consultation process before its release. The Commission pointedly noted: "There is neither a proper impact assessment nor an explanatory memorandum that provides enough material to state that the draft Directive respects [human rights]". 9 The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights remarked in its opinion: "It appears that the draft directive is neither based on a proper impact assessment nor on an extensive gathering of evidence in the 27 EU Member States."
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The absence of safeguards also drew stinging criticism from the European Data Protection Supervisor, who noted the lack of any reference to data protection instruments in the EIO and said that the measure "once again raise[s] the fundamental issue of the incomplete and inconsistent application of data protection principles in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters".
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Ireland did not opt into the EIO. The United Kingdom did, but Home Secretary Theresa May said that the "existing draft is not perfect" 12 and announced that the UK would negotiate a proportionality test and adequate dual criminality safeguards into the measure, so that UK police would not be faced with trivial cases to investigate or be required to collect evidence of conduct not classed as criminal under domestic law. Denmark has opted out of all justice and home affairs measures but is tasked with presenting the new text to Parliament when it takes over the EU presidency and steering the process on the Council's behalf. The latest draft improves somewhat on the original, by including: a proportionality test by the issuing State, protections against forum-shopping by prosecuting States, double jeopardy safeguards, and limited dual criminality and territoriality requirements. FTI had called for many of these fundamental safeguards in its July 2010 response to the proposal. We analyse the latest draft below.
Current draft and state of play

Scope
Article 1 defines the EIO as a judicial decision from the issuing State in order to have one or several specific investigative measures carried out in another Member State (the executing State), by forwarding the completed form contained in Annex A of the Directive (Article 5 (1)). An EIO may be issued with respect to criminal proceedings brought by, or that may be brought before, a judicial authority in respect of a criminal offence under the national law of the issuing State (Article 4(a)).
An EIO may also be issued in proceedings more vaguely defined as brought by "administrative authorities" or "judicial authorities" in respect of acts "punishable under the national law of the issuing state [as] infringements of the rules of law and where the decision may give rise to proceedings before a court having jurisdiction, in particular, in criminal matters" (Article 4(b) and (c)). Article 3 states that the EIO shall cover any investigative measure with the exception of setting up a joint investigation team and gathering evidence within such a team.
Issuing authorities; proportionality test
Article 2 defines two types of issuing authority: 1) a judge, a court, an investigating magistrate or a public prosecutor; and 2) any other competent authority as defined by the issuing State.
Where the second type of authority issues an EIO, it must be validated by a judge, a court, an investigating magistrate or a public prosecutor (Article 5a (3)). An EIO should only be sent to an executing State if the issuing authority is satisfied that an EIO is "necessary and proportionate", and that the investigative measure sought could have been ordered under the same conditions in a similar national case (Article 5a(1)).
The introduction of a proportionality assessment by the issuing State is a welcome addition, as are the provisions that require the measure to be one that could have been ordered in a similar national case. This should prevent "forum shopping" -prosecutors using the EIO to obtain an unfair advantage from differences between countries' procedural systems.
The validation procedure outlined in Article 5a(3) should ensure that the decision to issue an EIO is taken with the requisite judicial expertise and independence, but only if the validation 14 Text submitted for general approach, 9 December 2011 procedure is a genuine examination of the necessity, proportionality and legality of the request and not a mere "rubber-stamping" exercise.
Deadlines
The decision on the recognition or execution of the EIO must be taken, and the investigative measure carried out, with "the same celerity and priority as for a similar national case" (Article 11(1)). In any event the deadlines set out in Article 11 require the executing State to make a decision on the recognition or execution of the EIO no later than 30 days after receipt. The deadline may be extended by a maximum of 30 days. The investigative measure itself must be carried out no later than 90 days from the decision on recognition or execution.
Issuing State's authorities to assist with execution of EIOs
Article 8(3) provides that the issuing State may request that its authorities assist with the execution of the EIO. Such assistance would be in support of the competent authorities in the executing State "to the extent that the designated authorities of the issuing State would be able to assist in the execution of the investigate measure(s) mentioned in the EIO in a similar national case".
This request to assist must be complied with, provided that the assistance is not contrary to the fundamental principles of law of the executing State and does not harm its essential national security interests. Recital 11 states that, if necessary, the executing State should comply with a request to allow visiting authorities to assist with the execution of an EIO by "setting conditions as to the scope and nature of the attendance of the authorities of the issuing State". Article 3a states that assisting foreign authorities will be bound by the law of the executing State.
Visiting foreign officials will "not have any law enforcement powers" in the territory of the executing State, unless the execution of such powers is in accordance with the law of the executing State and to the extent agreed between issuing and executing authorities (Article 8(3a) ). This expressly allows for visiting authorities to be granted law enforcement powers and is highly concerning. Visiting authorities will not be familiar with the rules on how law enforcement officials of the executing State conduct investigations. They will not have had the same training as their counterparts in the executing State. This has the potential to cause confusion and lead to violations of the executing State's laws (and the fundamental rights those laws are designed to safeguard). In FTI's view, the EIO should contain a guarantee that visiting authorities will not have law enforcement powers while in the executing State. This should not be subject to any exceptions.
Where the issuing authority is assisting with the execution of an EIO, and is present in the executing State, it may issue a further EIO (related to the original EIO) directly to the executing authority (Article 7 (2)). This allows the issuing authority to ensure the gathering of all evidence it deems relevant, even if it is outside the scope of the original EIO. These secondary EIOs must be subject to the same safeguards as a standard EIO. Article 7 should in FTI's view be amended, to make it clear that the ability for a visiting authority to issue a further EIO is subject to the validation and proportionality safeguards contained in Article 5a.
Recourse to a different measure: do proposed anti-forum-shopping checks bring yet more complexity?
Article 9(1) sets out the circumstances in which the executing State must use a different investigatory measure than the one specified in the EIO. This will occur where the investigative measure indicated in the EIO does not exist in the executing State, or would not be available in a similar domestic case in the executing State. Article 9(3) provides that where either of these conditions is fulfilled and there is no other investigative measure which would have the same result, the executing authority must notify the issuing authority that it is unable to comply. This appears to create a separate refusal ground from those set out in Article 10. However, Article 9 does not apply in relation to non-coercive measures. See under "refusal grounds" below.
Article 9(1bis.) states that the executing State may also have recourse to a different investigative measure if it will produce the same result by less intrusive means. This seems to require the executing State to carry out a kind of proportionality test, assessing the intrusiveness of the measure requested and looking at other measures at its disposal with different degrees of intrusiveness. In principle, this is a positive move, though it introduces a degree of complexity into a regime intended to add simplicity to cross-border evidence requests.
Refusal grounds -a recipe for confusion?
Article 10(1) sets out the five general grounds for an executing state not to recognize or execute an EIO. These represent improvements on the initial draft, which made no reference to refusal for lack of dual criminality, territoriality or ne bis in idem. However, confusion is introduced by different refusal grounds being available for different types of measure, depending on the degree of coerciveness (something that is not clearly defined) and/or on the nature of the offence.
Immunity or privilege; freedom of expression The first ground on which the executing State may refuse an EIO is where an immunity or privilege under the law of the executing State makes it impossible to execute the EIO, or where rules limiting criminal liability in the context of freedom of the press and freedom of expression similarly make execution of the EIO unlawful.
National security
The second ground is if, in a specific case, the execution of the EIO would harm essential national security interests, jeopardise the source of the information or involve the use of classified information relating to specific intelligence activities.
Administrative case and measure not available in executing State
The third ground has two parts. First, the EIO must have been issued in proceedings brought by administrative or judicial authorities in respect of acts punishable in the issuing State by virtue of being infringements of the rules of law and where the decision may give rise to proceedings before a court having jurisdiction in criminal matters. The second part is that the measure would not be authorised under the law of the executing State in a similar domestic case.
It is concerning that this second limb does not apply as a refusal ground generally: instead, Recital (11) provides: "The execution of an EIO should, to the widest extent possible, and without prejudice to fundamental principles of the law of the executing State, be carried out in accordance with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the issuing State." It is unclear what "fundamental principles of law" would cover in the context of evidence-gathering. No State should be required to carry out an investigative act that is not expressly permitted under its own procedural system, whether "fundamental principles" are involved or not.
Double jeopardy
The fourth ground is that the execution of the EIO would be contrary to the principle of ne bis in idem. However, this ground does not apply where the issuing authority has provided an assurance that the information transferred as a result of the EIO shall not be used to prosecute a person whose case on the same facts has been finally disposed of in another Member State. (It is unclear why, in such circumstances, the evidence would be needed at all: arguably, this provision should go.)
Territoriality and dual criminality The fifth ground for refusal relates to territoriality and dual criminality where a coercive measure is sought. The executing State may refuse to recognise or execute an EIO if: (a) it relates to a criminal offence alleged to have been committed exclusively outside the territory of the issuing State and wholly or partially on the territory of the executing State; (b) the EIO seeks the use of a coercive measure:
15 and (c) the conduct in question is not an offence in the executing State.
Non-coercive measures
All but the last of these five refusal grounds apply to any EIO, regardless of the type of measure sought. However, the current draft differentiates between coercive and non-coercive measures and provides additional grounds of refusal where the EIO seeks coercive measures. These are not defined, but Article 10(1a) lists non-coercive measures as including:  the hearing of a witness, victim, suspect or third party in the territory of the executing State;  the obtaining of information or evidence already in the possession of the executing authority, provided it could have been obtained in accordance with the criminal law of the executing State (This begs the question: what about pre-existing evidence that was obtained coercively by the executing State, albeit legally?);  the obtaining of information contained in databases held by police or judicial authorities and directly accessible by the executing authority in connection with criminal proceedings;  the identification of persons holding a subscription to a specified phone number or IP address;
 and the catch-all: "any non-coercive investigative measure".
Also classed as a non-coercive measure is an order for search and seizure where this is requested in relation to an offence contained in the Framework list of 32 offences to which dual criminality does not apply (provided it is punishable in the issuing State by a maximum of at least three years). The refusal grounds in Article 10(1) apply to an EIO requesting these measures. However, the protections set out in Article 9(1) do not apply. Why this is so is unclear. The issuing State should have recourse to a different measure where the requested measure does not exist under its domestic law, even where that measure is non-coercive. If the measure is not available under domestic law, it should be refused. Furthermore, whether or not the offence is on the "list of 32", or punishable to a certain threshold, bears no relationship to the coerciveness of the measure sought.
This issue is further compounded by the absence of a clear definition of "coercive" and "noncoercive" investigative measures. Tighter definitions will be needed if these provisions are to be retained.
Coercive measure refusal grounds
If the measure requested does not fall into Article 10(1a) (i.e. it is a coercive measure) the refusal grounds in Article 10(1) apply, but in addition the EIO may be refused by the executing State on the two additional grounds set out in Article 10(1b). The first is dual criminality: the conduct for which the EIO has been issued does not constitute an offence under the law of the executing State. Again, this is subject to the proviso that the EIO cannot be refused on this ground if the offence falls within the Framework list of 32 categories of offence. The second additional ground is that the use of the measure requested is restricted under the law of the executing State to a list or category of offences, or to offences punishable by a certain threshold of sentence, and which does not include the offence covered by the EIO.
Remedies
Article 13(1) provides that Member States must ensure that any interested party is entitled to legal remedies equivalent to those available in a similar domestic case to challenge the investigative measure in question. The substantive reasons for issuing an EIO can only be challenged in an action brought in the issuing State (Article 13(3)). Issuing and executing authorities must ensure that interested parties receive information about legal remedies (Article 13(4)), subject to the need to ensure the confidentiality of an investigation.
Costs
Placing some cost burden on the issuing State is one way to limit disproportionate use of EIOs. However, the draft avoids this, attempting a compromise that does not go far enough. It provides that the executing State must bear the costs of executing an EIO (Article Y(1)), but where it considers that the execution costs may become "exceptionally high", it may consult with the issuing authority as to how the costs can be shared or the request modified (Article Y(2)). If there is no agreement, the issuing authority may decide to cover the part of the costs which the executing State deems exceptionally high, or withdraw the EIO.
Temporary transfer of prisoners
Article 19 allows an EIO to be issued for the temporary transfer of a person in custody in the executing State in order to have an investigative measure carried out for which his presence in the territory of the issuing State is required. This would enable measures to be carried out whether the person is a suspect or a mere witness. Such transfer is possible only if the person "shall be sent back within the period stipulated by the executing State" (Article 19 (1)). Article 19 (7) provides that a person shall not be prosecuted or detained for acts or convictions that preceded his departure from the issuing State "and which are not specified in the EIO". This suggests that where the person is subsequently suspected of the offence to which the EIO relates, the issuing State can commence proceedings against him even if he has been transferred under Article 19. This gives prosecution authorities an unacceptable method of circumventing extradition mechanisms. Article 19 should be amended to state that where the transfer is for the purposes of prosecution and bringing a person to trial, an EAW should be issued.
Absence of safeguards for transferred prisoners
The Article 19 provisions are designed for "temporary" transfer. However, no limit is set on the time the transferred person can spend in the executing State. Furthermore, the Article is silent on protecting transferred persons from poor prison conditions post-transfer, or how this risk should be assessed by executing States. Amendments should also be added excluding prisoners under 18, mentally disabled or otherwise vulnerable.
These concerns apply equally to Article 20, which deals with the temporary transfer of persons held in custody in the issuing State to the executing State. Articles 19 and 20 contain similar provisions, but Article 20 requires that the "opinion" of the person in custody must be taken into account when deciding whether to issue an EIO. In FTI's view, same should apply to those whose transfer is sought from the executing State.
Other provisions in brief
Article 21 provides for requests for evidence be given via videoconference. A new suggested recital proposes that provisions on hearing an accused via videoconference could be used as an effective alternative to extradition with a view to "the proportionate use of European Arrest Warrants". Article 22 contains similar provisions in relation to evidence given via telephone conference but only regarding witnesses, not suspects or accused persons.
This lends force to the concerns FTI has raised about the premature or inappropriate use of EAWs as an aid to investigation, rather than for prosecution, which has resulted in some of our clients being extradited only to be returned later without charge, often spending months in pretrial detention.
Articles 23 and 24 govern the gathering of information on bank accounts and banking transactions. Article 27 sets out provisions on gathering evidence in real time, continuously and over a certain period of time (for example, controlled deliveries in the executing State). Article 27a deals with covert investigations and Articles 27b and 27d govern interception of telecommunications (an area to which the original draft of the EIO only applied in a limited fashion). Article 27e sets out the rules on the use of an EIO to prevent provisionally "the destruction, transformation, moving, transfer or disposal of item [sic] that may be used as evidence".
Human rights -enough protection?
Article 1(3) states: "This Directive shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect the fundamental rights and legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union". Recital 17 contains a similar guarantee and provides that nothing in the Directive may be interpreted as prohibiting the refusal of an EIO where there are reasons to believe that it has been issued for the purpose of prosecuting a person on account of his or her sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion, sexual orientation, nationality, language or political opinions. The current draft does not contain a human rights ground for refusal. However, Article 10(1) states that the refusal grounds are without prejudice to Article 1(3). : given the stringent admissibility requirements and the cost of taking cases to Strasbourg, this must be the tip of the iceberg.
Lessons from the EAW
The gathering, storing and sharing of evidence by prosecution authorities can involve interference with many basic rights, and the EIO must contain adequate safeguards to ensure these rights are not unnecessarily violated simply in the name of mutual recognition. FTI's cases illustrate that this has been a significant problem with the EAW, with some Member States' courts failing adequately to scrutinise the human rights implications of extradition or apply the principle of proportionality in connection with extradition requests, for fear of falling foul of the mutual recognition principle.
FTI has called for amendment to the Framework Decision on the EAW to allow executing States, once alerted to a serious risk of rights infringement, to ask the issuing State for further information, and where necessary, guarantees that the fundamental rights of the requested person will be respected. Where the issuing State does not provide the information within a reasonable time, or the information is insufficient, the requested State should be entitled to refuse to extradite.
A similar protection should be included in the EIO. In the evidence-gathering context, a rigorous examination of fundamental rights by Member State authorities is crucial, because in many cases the need to keep the investigation confidential will mean that the affected person will be unaware of EIO until information about them has been seized and transferred. They will therefore be unable to make representations about the impact execution of the EIO will have on their fundamental rights, making the "Remedies" clause pointless.
The final instrument must make it clear that an EIO should not be executed where it would disproportionately infringe the rights of affected persons. The most effective way to do this is to include a human rights and proportionality bar in Article 10. The call for an express human rights refusal ground has been echoed by the Meijers Committee, 17 which also notes that Article 1(3) "may give rise to misunderstandings and diverging implementation by Member States." 18
Data protection provisions inadequate
In his report on the initial draft of the EIO the European Data Protection Supervisor noted: "Situations which involve the cross-border exchange of information within the EU deserve special attention since the processing of personal data in more than one jurisdiction increases the risks to the rights and interests of natural persons involved."
Directive, to ensure that Member State authorities are aware of the legislative framework in which they are operating when issuing and executing EIOs.
EIO still silent on use by the defence
The current draft continues to lack any reference to the rights of the defence to use an EIO in order to gather exculpatory evidence located in another Member State. The final instrument must work in a similar way to many countries' existing MLA implementation laws, by enabling defence evidence-gathering on reasonable request or at the court's own initiative.
In FTI's view, the EIO should expressly enable the defence to obtain relevant evidence through an EIO. Unless the EIO also applies to defence requests for evidence, dispensing with MLA would, in effect, reduce the tools currently available to the defence (in some jurisdictions) to gather the evidence necessary for a fair trial.
More generally, the rights of the defence to gather evidence and enable necessary investigation in order to obtain evidence in other Member States must be given far more consideration in discussions on evidence-gathering. FTI works with defence practitioners from across Europe through its Legal Experts Advisory Panel. Many complain about the hurdles faced by the defence in some Member States when attempting to gather evidence, particularly where legallyaided. The EIO offers a valuable opportunity to address this.
Minimum standards and admissibility -the EIO's fatal flaw?
There is a significant risk that the EIO cannot operate successfully without minimum standards of evidence-gathering in place, to ensure admissibility of evidence in the issuing State. This was a problem highlighted in the Commission's Green Paper, which asked Member States and other interested parties to provide their views on the validity of establishing these minimum standards. This is an important consideration and one that is missing from the EIO.
If the admissibility of cross-border evidence is not ensured, precious crime-fighting resources will have been wasted for nothing. In sacrificing the flexibility of the MLA system, the EU will have preferred efficiency over the need to ensure the successful prosecution of serious crossborder crime in a region with diverse rules on admissibility and investigations.
Conclusion -move to EIO must involve real improvements on existing system, including greater protection for the defence
Efficient cross-border evidence-gathering is crucial in the fight against serious crime. It is right that the EU should concern itself with finding better ways for Member States investigate crime and share evidence across borders. Any new instrument in this field must add value to the current MLA regime, while ensuring that the whole range of fundamental rights engaged by evidence-gathering are protected, including the ability of the defence to obtain and adduce relevant evidence.
Given its scope for violation of basic rights, it is unfortunate that the EIO was published without an impact assessment looking closely at data protection and fundamental rights issues. It is also a pity that the proposing States presented no objective data showing why the only solution is ditching the MLA system, rather than improving it. With hindsight, it was probably unwise for the initiating States to propose the EIO before the Commission's wider-ranging work was complete.
Despite its controversial beginnings, the EIO has improved somewhat since its original incarnation. However, the move from the flexible, request-based MLA system to the EIO's rigid and automated mutual recognition model brings risks for individual rights and further safeguards are still required. MEPs will be alert to this, as they come to consider the text. When the EAW was adopted they did not have co-decision and though many called for stronger protections for requested persons, their demands went unheeded and the unfortunate results are now clear.
In this context it is also crucial that ongoing legislative work on strengthening procedural rights at EU level continues: if the defence is to be treated fairly in the context of evidence-gathering, proper access to legal advice (legally aided where necessary) is key, and a strong Directive will be needed to bring many Member States into line with Article 6 ECHR and the Salduz line of cases. A Commission draft text is under negotiation and aspects of it are proving hard for some Member States to accept. 20 Again, the importance of MEPs, as EU citizens' elected representatives, standing up for fundamental rights in the context of EU justice cannot be overestimated.
If the intention of Belgium and the other proposing States was to simplify MLA, the EIO falls short of that ambition in many respects, perhaps belying the difficulty of applying the mutual recognition model to something as complex and diverse as cross-border evidence-gathering. Will a "one-size fits all" approach ever be possible without harmonized investigation procedures and admissibility rules?
The interests of justice are as important in the context of gathering, handling, retaining and sharing evidence as they are in the context of extradition. They cannot be served if fundamental rights are sidelined.
